The relation between morality and religion has often been discussed. However, it is not always recognized that the relation varies greatly according to the variety of religions. I shall here be concerned solely with Christian theism in its traditional form. I take the latter to signify, essentially, belief in a morally perfect Creator who exists in the threefold form of Father, Son and Holy Spirit and who, in the person of the Son, became man in Christ for our salvation. I (...) thus exclude from consideration all non-theistic accounts of God or the Absolute. Also I shall consider, not simply bare theism of the kind that Christians share with Jews and Muslims, but also the distinctively Christian form of theism that is generated by distinctively Christian revelation. Many otherwise sound descriptions of the relation between morality and theism are defective because they fail to consider the distinctively Christian contribution to the theistic concept of God and of his relation to the world. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to resolve two paradoxes, which occur in quantum theory, by using the discussion of the theory of measurement presented in two earlier papers by the author [3], [4], [5]. The two paradoxes discussed will be the Schrödinger cat paradox and the Einstein, Podolski, Rosen paradox [2]. An introductory section will be included which summarizes the relevant results from the author's previous papers. Also a discussion will be made regarding the author's interpretation of the density (...) operator. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution toward developing a theory of expansions of semi-Heyting algebras. It grew out of an attempt to settle a conjecture we had made in 1987. Firstly, we unify and extend strikingly similar results of [ 48 ] and [ 50 ] to the (new) equational class DHMSH of dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting algebras, or to its subvariety BDQDSH of blended dual quasi-De Morgan semi-Heyting algebras, thus settling the conjecture. Secondly, we give a criterion for a unary expansion (...) of semi-Heyting algebras to be a discriminator variety and give an algorithm to produce discriminator varieties. We then apply the criterion to exhibit an increasing sequence of discriminator subvarieties of BDQDSH . We also use it to prove that the variety DQSSH of dually quasi-Stone semi- Heyting algebras is a discriminator variety. Thirdly, we investigate a binary expansion of semi-Heyting algebras, namely the variety DblSH of double semi-Heyting algebras by characterizing its simples, and use the characterization to present an increasing sequence of discriminator subvarieties of DblSH . Finally, we apply these results to give bases for “small” subvarieties of BDQDSH , DQSSH , and DblSH. (shrink)

Studying the typical development of reading is key to understanding the precise deficits that underlie reading disabilities. An important correlate of efficient reading is the speed of naming arrays of simple stimuli such as letters and pictures. In this cross-sectional study, we examined developmental changes in visual processing that occurs during letter and object naming from childhood to early adulthood in terms of behavioral task efficiency, associated articulation and eye movement parameters, and the coordination between them, as measured by eye-voice (...) span in both the spatial and temporal domains. We used naming speed tasks, in which participants were required to name sets of letters or simple objects as quickly and as accurately as possible. Single stimulus manipulations were made to these tasks to make the stimuli either more visually and/or phonologically similar to one another in order to examine how these manipulations affected task performance and the coordination between speech and eye movements. Across development there was an increased efficiency in speech and eye movement performance and their coordination in both the spatial and temporal domains. Furthermore, manipulations to the phonological and visual similarity of specific letter and object stimuli revealed that orthographic processing played a greater role than phonological processing in performance, with the contribution of phonological processing diminishing across development. This comprehensive typical developmental trajectory provides a benchmark for clinical populations to elucidate the nature of the cognitive dysfunction underlying reading difficulties. (shrink)

Institutional review boards, tasked with facilitating ethical research, are often pulled in competing directions. In what we call the protection-inclusion dilemma, we acknowledge the tensions IRBs face in aiming to both protect potential research participants from harm and include under-represented populations in research. In this manuscript, we examine the history of protectionism that has dominated research ethics oversight in the United States, as well as two responses to such protectionism: inclusion initiatives and critiques of the term vulnerability. We look at (...) what we know about IRB decision-making in relation to protecting and including “vulnerable” groups in research and examine the lack of regulatory guidance related to this dilemma, which encourages protection over inclusion within IRB practice. Finally, we offer recommendations related to how IRBs might strike a better balance between inclusion and protection in research ethics oversight. (shrink)

Calls for compensation are heard in many countries all over the world. Spokespersons on behalf of formerly oppressed and dominated groups call for compensation for the deeply traumatic injustices their members have suffered in the past. Sometimes these injustices were suffered decades ago by members already deceased. How valid are such claims to compensation and should they be honoured as a matter of justice? The focus of this essay is on these issues of compensatory justice. I want to look at (...) the issue from the perspective of the eradication of systematic poverty affecting particular groups—where injustices of the distant past can reliably be identified as one of the major contributory factors to people’s current poverty. In the paper I will examine the following issues: (1) What kind of injustices qualify to be remedied by means of compensatory justice? (2) Should there be a limit to how far back in history one should go to compensate for injustice? (3) How can an injustice from the distant past be reliably identified as a cause of current problems? (4) Who should be compensated? (5) Who is responsible for compensation? (6) What form should compensation take? (7) Is the concept of compensatory justice backward looking or forward looking? I will argue for a moral obligation to the effect that serious injustices, perpetrated long ago against a group of people and caused them to be poor, ought to be compensated by society in a variety of ways to the original victims (if still alive) and their descendants. (shrink)

If humans may indeed legitimately intervene in conservation areas to let nature be and to protect the lives of all the diverse individual animals under their care, then the management of elephants must be legitimate as part of the conservation of natural world diversities. If this is so, to what extent are current management options ethically acceptable? In this article I address the ethics of the management options available once the judgement has been made that there are too many elephants (...) in a conservation area. I evaluate the ethical acceptability of four options, i.e., the simulation of nature, translocation, contraception, and culling. I furthermore ask whether the harsh blow of culling under very specific conditions can be softened by the taming and training of African elephants. I then examine the ethics of decision making about these issues. Before I do so, two issues must be discussed that decisively influence the management of elephants. The one is whether it is ethically justifiable to fence in elephants. The second is the ethical requirements of the scientific practice that informs management decisions. In the article I come to the conclusion that all four options are ethically flawed. All four require some violation of the important injunction to let nature be and to treat individual animals with respect. However, to do nothing and allow a loss of other species violates the important goal of conserving natural world diversity. (shrink)

In this article I present an alternative philosophy of science based on ideas drawn from the study of complex adaptive systems. As a result of the spectacular expansion in scientific disciplines, the number of scientists and scientific institutions in the twentieth century, I believe science can be characterised as a complex system. I want to interpret the processes of science through which scientists themselves determine what counts as good science. This characterisation of science as a complex system can give an (...) answer to the question why the sciences are so successful in solving growing numbers of problems and correcting their own mistakes. I utilise components of complexity theory to explain and interpret science as a complex system. I first explain the concept of complexity in ordinary language. The explanation of science as a complex system starts with a definition of the basic rules that guide the behaviour of science as a complex system. Next, I show how various sciences result through the implementation of these rules in the study of a specific aspect of reality. The explanation of the growth of science through evolutionary adaptation and learning forms the core of the article. (shrink)

The history of philosophy provides part of the history, or pre-history, of the social sciences. As they were struggling into being, or even before they existed, philosophy was hammering out some of the conceptual tools, lines of approach and basic hypotheses. One of the constantly recurring themes in the history of philosophy which has a direct bearing on the social sciences is the relationship between mind and matter.

Awareness of, and respect for differences of gender, race, religion, language, and culture have liberated many oppressed groups from the hegemony of white, Western males. However, respect for previously denigrated collective identities should not be allowed to confine individuals to identities constructed around one main component used for political mobilisation, or to identities that depend on a priority of properties that are not optional, like race, gender, and language. In this article I want to sketch an approach for accommodating different (...) kinds of identity within a multicultural constitutional democracy. From a vantage point provided by a definition and explanation of personal identity, I want to show how people define, construct and change their personal identities to make themselves into unique individuals. Next I show how democratic political institutions and the personal identities of individuals reciprocally influence one another. In the final section I sketch ways in which diverse personal identities ought to be accommodated in multicultural constitutional democracies. The conclusion is that a society which gives its members the liberty, space, and opportunity to freely construct their own identities might avoid the formation of closed groups committed exclusively to their own sectional interests. (shrink)

Dilthey is a figure of real importance in European philosophy and social theory. He exerted a significant influence on Husserl, Heidegger and Weber through his work on the nature of philosophy and the methodology and epistemology of human and social studies. He was also a distinguished and original historian of ideas and, indeed, many of his philosophical interests arose from the insights and practical difficulties he encountered as a historian. He produced a monumental biography of Schleiermacher, and a series of (...) shorter, but no less striking studies of Hegel, Dickens, Shakespeare, Schiller and many others. (shrink)

First published in 1935, The Life and Writings of Giambattista Vico is a succinct biography of the Italian philosopher, Giambattista Vico. Carefully documented, the book comments on Vico's life as well as his oeuvre in a bid to extend his audience to the English-speaking population. From his early childhood to the influence of his writings after his death, the book provides a keen insight into the many facets of his philosophy. This book will be of interest to students of philosophy (...) and history. (shrink)

Culling seems to be a cruel method of human interference in the lives of elephants. The method of culling is generally used to control population numbers of highly developed mammals to protect vegetation and habitat for other less important species. Many people are against human interference in the lives of elephants. In this article aspects of this highly controversial issue are explored. Three fascinating characteristics of this ethical dilemma are discussed in the introductory part, and then the major arguments raised (...) against human interference in the lives of elephants are evaluated. These arguments are the following: First, that nature should be allowed to run its course and establish its own balance; nature will thus solve the problem of elephant overpopulation. The second argument raised by animal-rights activists as well as by animal-welfare groups either claim that animals have rights that humans must respect at all times, or that all sentient beings have interests that humans ought to respect, as those beings can experience pleasure or pain. The third argument often associates culling elephants as method for population control with the commercial use and exploitation of wilderness areas. Many people argue that it is unethical to use wildlife as a sustainable resource for fighting poverty. In conclusion it is stated that despite these arguments human intervention in the lives of elephants are ethically justified. (shrink)

Philosophic anthropology, Pursuing philosophy's traditional search for reflective self-Knowledge seeks to crystallize the ideas of man underpinning empirical research and moral ideals. Neither the claim that pure speculation can produce factual knowledge nor the contention that a higher synthesis of empirical findings can become philosophy is acceptable. Philosophic anthropology is, Therefore, Most usefully conceived as a critique which traces the necessary presuppositions of the study of man in its various forms of the more rules we apply.

It is difficult to describe this book without praising it. Collected here in one volume are some thirty-six high quality translations into English of the most important foreign-language works in mathematical logic, as well as articles and letters by Whitehead, Russell, Norbert Weiner and Post. The contents of the volume are arranged in chronological order, beginning with Frege's Begriffsschrift—translated in its entirety—and concluding with Gödel's famous "On Formally Undecidable Propositions" and Herbrand's "On the Consistency of Arithmetic". The translation of the (...) Gödel article is a small masterpiece, and is especially welcome in view of some of the rather poor efforts which have been made to render this important work into English. But this is more than a paste-pot job of anthologizing. Van Heijenoort and others have written prefaces to each of the included selections, in which are provided background historical and bibliographical information, comments on the intellectual currents which led to the production of the article, and, in many cases, a digest of the important theorems and concepts in the article itself. Each selection is a classic in its own right. In reading through the selections in this volume, one is struck by the extent to which purely mathematical problems and issues have controlled recent logical inquiry and have determined the development of various philosophies of mathematics. In the early stages, Frege and Peano were concerned with the logical reconstruction of arithmetic, and this led to the work of Russell and the logicist philosophy. Already in the development of the new logic there were certain problems which were resolved with Russell's theory of types—a device which many mathematicians felt to be rather artificial. The use of set theory, beginning with Cantor and reaching its maturity in Zermelo's 1904 proof of the well-ordering theorem, gave rise to a new set of difficulties concerning the axioms of choice, the continuum problem, and infinite sets. The two traditions are brought together in a common nexus of foundational problems by Weiner in 1914 and by Skolem's form of the Löwenheim theorem, given in 1920. Hereafter, the way is open for the rise of mathematical inquiry into the foundations of number systems, set theory and logic by Post, Skolem, von Neumann, Hilbert, Bernays, Gödel and many others. The work was far from completed by 1931, but a new and important tradition in mathematical inquiry had been established, and had come into its own. This book is, in effect, the record of an important chapter in the history of thought. No serious student of logic or foundations of mathematics will want to be without it.—H. P. K. (shrink)

The articles published in this volume will bring that knowledge which alone fortifies a student against wrong or fanciful occultism, as against the perils of ...

The famous passage in which Plotinus declares that fine art, so far from simply reproducing nature, ‘goes back to the Reason-principles from which nature herself emanates,’ has hitherto been generally regarded as a tacit criticism of Plato's teaching, and as an original contribution to the philosophy of art involving a rupture with the entire previous tradition of Greek aesthetic theory. Yet Plotinus introduces it, not as if he were proclaiming a new gospel, but almost casually, as a subordinate link in (...) his discussion of Intelligible Beauty. And though his respect for Plato was not the half-superstitious reverence of the later Neoplatonists, he was at all times more zealous to walk in Plato's footsteps than to correct or criticize him, tacitly or otherwise. Moreover, can it be said with certainty that his doctrine is in itself opposed to Plato's? That question can be answered only by a detailed examination of Plato's theory of art—a task which I hope to accomplish elsewhere. In the present article, postponing all enquiry into the relation between these two aesthetic theories, I shall endeavour to show that the teaching of Plotinus was not a sudden innovation, but the natural and indeed inevitable outcome of preceding thought. (shrink)

On 9 August 1994 the German legislature revised the German Drug Law (AMG). Included in the revision is a passage requiring, for the first time, that the sponsors and investigators of clinical studies involving human subjects first obtain the approval of an ethics committee before carrying out such studies. According to the legislation, which takes effect on 17 August 1995, approval is to come from 'an independent ethics committee, set up and administered according to state law [emphasis added]' (1). Although (...) it is clear according to the text that the 16 federal states have been empowered to establish ethics committees within their jurisdictions, this does not mean that the state governments are free to transfer exclusive authority in the matter to their respective medical associations, a step that would effectively abolish Germany's private ethics committees. First, the legislation does not rule out the authorization of private ethics committees. Second, as legal scholars attest, the exclusive control of ethics committees by the medical associations would constitute an illegal monopoly. Third, it is arguable that medical-association ethics committees fail to meet the one prior federal requirement, that of independence. There is a great deal of confusion in Germany today about which kinds of ethics committees (public and/or private) the states will sanction before 17 August 1995. In an attempt to sort things out we present a brief explanation of how ther came to be two kinds of ethics committees in Germany, review the legal battle between the two over the issue of authorization, point out how the German legislature, in passing the recent bill, has missed an opportunity to clarify the issue and, finally suggest why the administration of ethics committees by the medical associations may be incompatible with the requirement that ethics committees be independent. (shrink)

These comments on Professor Gallie's paper, ‘Kant's View of Reason in Politics’ are focused on a particular issue, and I shall explain at the outset what it is and why I have concentrated on it. Gallie's account of the details of Kant's political philosophy and his specific comments on them strike me as interesting and reasonable and I have, therefore, little to add. Instead I want to question Gallie's assumptions about, and dissatisfactions with, the philosophic framework on which Kant's political (...) philosophy rests. There is, firstly, his complaint that reason is insufficiently defined though he takes a somewhat more positive view later. There is, secondly, his claim that Kant's moral philosophy is inferior to his epistemology . On these points Gallie is, in my view, not convincing and not even completely clear. Without disagreeing totally with Gallie's assessments—still less claiming that Kant is invariably right—I want to argue that Kant's conclusions are formidably supported by, and can best be understood in terms of, his own arguments. To me the question about the cogency of his case is more interesting than the details of his political philosophy. How rational are, in fact, his conclusions? So, at the risk of covering some familiar ground, I want to stress some of the general features of Kant's philosophy and argue, in particular, that his political philosophy is based on and, in turn, supplements, his moral one. The latter seems to me to be as intricate, interesting and fruitful as his epistemology and exhibits a similar architectonic. .). (shrink)

Laland et al. suggest that as a specific evolutionary force niche construction has entailed the encephalization of the brain. While not denying rapid co-evolution of brain traits and abilities with niches and cultures, I argue that encephalization reflects a classical genetic buffer system allowing rapid evolutionary adaptation independent of the nature of the selective pressure.

The fate of the half a million or so free-ranging elephants in Africa depends on the choices people will make. What ‘moral standing’ do elephants deserve, and thus what constraints should we impose on our behaviour towards them? To assess the state of our knowledge about ethics and elephants is no easy affair. Different views on the moral standing of elephants and thus the obligations humans owe elephants, are not really a matter of scientific knowledge, although such knowledge might deeply (...) influence our chosen ethics. At stake are human value choices that are developed through argument and discussion into ethical positions that suggest, prescribe, or legislate acceptable behaviour, and proscribe or discourage unacceptable treatment of elephants. The point of this assessment is thus to determine which ethical positions have been developed on various matters concerning the management of elephants and have been justified through reasoning. This chapter portrays the different ethical views relevant to the management of elephants that are present in some or other form in the public domain. The aim is to make readers aware of the multiplicity of ethical issues involved in elephant management, as seen from a variety of ethical viewpoints. The complexity of the benefits and harm that accompany different management options will be clarified. The chapter is divided into five sections: (1) our human responsibility towards elephants, (2) the accountability of elephant custodians, (3) the moral standing of elephants, (4) ethical theories, and (5) ethics and management options. (shrink)

Plato’s views on the significance of poverty and wealth in The Republic challenge us to rethink the role and position assigned to wealth in contemporary society. These ideas on poverty and wealth play an important role in shaping the central arguments of the Republic. The themes and views expressed in the opening dialogue of Plato’s Republic (328b - 331d) serve to introduce some of the core ideas of the Republic. I start with an analysis of the opening dialogue and then (...) I proceed to discuss the significance of Plato’s views on poverty and wealth in the context of the Republic. Through this analysis I want to establish the claim that Plato argues for the following: [1] that justice, in the sense of the morality of individuals and societies, is far more important than the acquisition of wealth, [2] that moderate wealth is important for its function to enable humans to live a moral life, [3] that poverty and excessive wealth have negative consequences for both individuals and societies, and [4] that desiring and possessing excessive wealth disrupts and destroys moral integrity and internal harmony in individuals and societies. (shrink)

The contemporary debate on justice is understandably dominated by theories and arguments addressing the problems of justice pertinent to nearly just societies, as virtually all the theorists participating in this debate live in such societies. They are obviously, and rightly so, first and foremost concerned with the philosophical problems of their own societies. Although almost all the contemporary theories of justice were formulated in the context of nearly just societies, why can we not apply them to the issues and problems (...) of radically unjust societies? The view that such a move is permissible and wise is at present no more than an unexamined assumption, an unargued view. Such an unargued view leads to the suspicion that a strong case may be made that radically unjust societies generate problems of social and political justice that should be considered in their own right. This does not imply that theories of justice developed in the context of, and aimed at, those issues current in nearly just societies should be disregarded or discarded. What is required are arguments to indicate to what extent the theoretical insights and wisdom contained in these theories can be utilized in a discussion of the social and political problems of radically unjust societies. I argue for the view that the contemporary debate on justice contains a major deficiency. In this article, I attempt to specify this major deficiency, namely that exclusive attention is given to the problems of nearly just societies while the problems of radically unjust societies are mostly ignored. The strategy will be to raise issues pertinent to radically unjust societies and note the extent to which clear and unambiguous solutions could be provided by participants in the contemporary debate on justice. (shrink)

Most of us can easily identify human beings suffering from poverty, but find it slightly more difficult to understand poverty properly. In this essay I want to deepen our understanding of poverty by interpreting the conventional definitions of poverty in a new light. I start with a defence of a claim that poverty is a concept uniquely applicable to humans. I then present a critical discussion of the distinction between absolute and relative poverty. I argue that a revision of this (...) distinction can provide us general standards applicable to humans everywhere. (shrink)

In this article, I reply to three discussions of Poverty, Ethics and Justice that are published in this symposium of the Journal. In my book I argued for a moral obligation on the part of the state and an array of other agents to eradicate poverty, but critics maintain that doing so would be impossible, either because it would logically contradict the liberal ends of the state, or because it would undermine a robust commitment to democratic choice, or because it (...) would be inconsistent with the attempt to control climate change. Here I provide a comprehensive reply to all three in light of a political philosophy of the state as fundamentally obligated to respect human dignity, where the latter is not reducible to autonomy, but is instead grounded on a much broader conception of human nature. (shrink)

In this article I respond to the thoughtful criticisms of my book articulated by Gillian Brock, Thaddeus Metz, and Darrel Moellendorf. Their critical questioning offers me an opportunity to reformulate aspects of the book so that I more accurately say exactly what I had in mind when writing the book. The first section contains a reworking of my definition of poverty to eliminate any ambiguity and demonstrate what kind of comparative judgements the definition allows us to make. The second section (...) looks anew at the multiple moral sources for our obligation to eradicate poverty. In the third section I focus on issues that could hinder attempts at eradicating poverty. One is the lack of accessible knowledge that might be too demanding to acquire. The other is the possibility that all attempts to eradicate poverty might have to be put on hold until oppressive capitalist development has prepared the circumstances for a more socialist distribution of resources. I argue that neither of these concerns should hinder the eradication of poverty. (shrink)

During his lifetime, F.C.S. Schiller was viewed as a major figure in the pragmatist movement, but his reputation has faded. This article will challenge the view that he was an unoriginal or less important figure. In particular, I will attempt a reconstruction of Schiller’s position on first philosophy, which will examine the differences between Schiller and the other major figures in the pragmatist movement. By using texts from Schiller’s writings, I attempt to create an undistorted reconstruction of what he wrote (...) in order to support this interpretation. I outline the implicit system contained in Schiller’s scattered writings and briefly examine the relation between Schiller’s humanism and other forms of pragmatism. The task seems both justified and worthwhile, since his work has been neglected, despite his prominence in the debates over pragmatism that took place when it emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. (shrink)

We are grateful to everyone who took the time to offer such insightful comments with regard to the protection–inclusion dilemma in research oversight. Nearly all respondents agreed that this dilemm...

This contribution is a gentle introduction to so-called dynamic epistemic logics, that can describe how agents change their knowledge and beliefs. We start with a concise introduction to epistemic logic, through the example of one, two and finally three players holding cards; and, mainly for the purpose of motivating the dynamics, we also very summarily introduce the concepts of general and common knowledge. We then pay ample attention to the logic of public announcements, wherein agents change their knowledge as the (...) result of public announcements. One crucial topic in that setting is that of unsuccessful updates: formulas that become false when announced. The Moore-sentences that were already extensively discussed at the conception of epistemic logic in Hintikka’s ‘Knowledge and Belief ’ (1962) give rise to such unsuccessful updates. After that, we present a few examples of more complex epistemic updates. (shrink)

Motivated by a paper by Barut and Meystre, Bohm's EPR gedanken experiment performed with classical and spin-s particles is considered, and the applicability of Bell's theorem to these cases is discussed. The classical model presented by Barut and Meystre is modified to become a stochastic local hidden-variable model reproducing the results of an EPR experiment of the type performed by Aspect et al.

Can a man be a feminist? If so, what would it mean? I want to participate in a dialogue between women and men on how to accommodate women’s moral concerns. I propose that the fundamental values of justice embodied in the South African constitutional democracy require men to be feminist. These values provide the best safeguard of the important interests and values of both women and men. Men who accept these values can support the main concerns of feminism. The implications (...) of the argument in this article range from public issues to the most private aspects of marriage. (shrink)

I provide a philosophical analysis of the claim that ICTs are necessary preconditions for the eradication of poverty. What are the links between information and communication technologies (ICTs) and poverty? I first define technology and then give a brief depiction of ICTs. Thereafter I define poverty and give a brief explanation of its context and causes. Next I discuss the relationship between poverty and ICTs in three paradigm cases: [i] the role of ICTs in poor societies, [ii] the effect of (...) poor ICT knowledge and skill of individuals in highly developed technological societies, and [iii] the impact of impoverished ICT knowledge and skills on the rich, powerful, and intelligent ones in society. I propose a procedure for decision making about the appropriation of ICTs by individuals and societies. I assess the claim that both access to ICTs and effective use of them are preconditions for the eradication of poverty. (shrink)

A methodology of the human studies needs to settle the conflict between the two long-established truth-seeking approaches. To be scientific, like physics, promises system, precision, and practical applicability but ignores the significant peculiarity of the subject matter: People talk. Hermeneutics, the methodology of interpretation, confronts the difficulties of understanding what people mean, but is suspected of lacking rigor. However, the two approaches are not exclusive alternatives. Sharing common procedures, such as classification and deduction, they also supplement each other: Interpretation depends (...) on factual evidence and scientific objectivity depends on reliable communication. Successful research needs to combine scientific study of facts with methodical interpretation of meaning. (shrink)

Summary. — The following theorem is proved.: If the statistical predictions of quantum theory are true in general and. if the macroscopic world is not radically different from what is observed, then what happens macroscopically in one space-time region must in some cases depend on variables that are controlled by experimenters in far-away, space-like-separated. regions. By what happens macroscopically in one space-time region is meant specifically the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a macroscopic event, such as the d.etection and recording of (...) a particle by some macroscopic device. By a variable controlled. by an experimenter in a certain space-time region is meant specifically the experimental setting in that region of some macroscopic device, in which this setting is controlled. by an experimenter acting within that region. The theorem pertains speci6cally to experimental situations in which there .are two far-apart, spacelike-separated. regions in each of which there is a device that can be set at either of two alternative settings by an experimenter acting within ' that region. There. is also a long sequence of experimental results (4.e. events) in each of the two regions. The theorem asserts that, for some such cases, it is mathematically impossible, within the manifold. (shrink)

A tendency towards diffuse and piecemeal linguistic analysis threatens to overwhelm Anglo-Saxon philosophy to-day. Stringent linguistic analysis can indeed be valuable, but much that has been written recently, for instance, in Mind , the stronghold of linguistic analysis, shows no trace of clearly grasped method and well understood aims. The result is meandering discursiveness, the collection of trivial anecdotes and the random mixing of linguistic, psychological and sociological reflections leading to no clear conclusions.

This paper is about the similarity between the appreciation of a piece of art, such as a cherished music album, and the loving appreciation of a person whom one knows well. In philosophical discussion about the rationality of love, the Qualities View (QV) says that love can be justified by reference to the qualities of the beloved. I argue that the oft-rehearsed trading-up objection fails to undermine the QV. The problems typically identified by the objection arise from the idea that (...) love-worthy qualities could be coarse-grained, when in fact they must be fine-grained. The analogy with appreciation of aesthetic qualities helps to draw out this point. Once the fine-grained nature of love-worthy qualities is properly understood, it is clear that critics of the QV cannot rely on the trading-up objection to motivate its rejection. Moreover, the paper’s core argument helps to illuminate the persistently aesthetic nature of interpersonal affections. (shrink)

Some reasons are thought to depend on relations between people, such as that of a promiser to a promisee. It has sometimes been assumed that all reasons that are relational in this way are moral obligations. I argue, via a counter example, that there are non-obligatory relational reasons. If true, this has ramifications for relational theories of morality.

Being able to ask others to do things, and thereby giving them reasons to do those things, is a prominent feature of our interpersonal lives. In this paper, I discuss the distinctive normative status of requests – what makes them different from commands and demands. I argue for a theory of this normative phenomenon which explains the sense in which the reasons presented in requests are a matter of discretion. This discretionary quality, I argue, is something that other theories cannot (...) accommodate, though it is a significant aspect of the relations that people stand in to one another, and the kinds of practical reasons that flow from those relations. (shrink)

A lineage of prominent philosophers who have discussed the second-person relation can be regarded as advancing structural accounts. They posit that the second-person relation effects one transformative change to the structure of practical reasoning. In this paper, I criticise this orthodoxy and offer an alternative, substantive account. That is, I argue that entering into second-personal relations with others does indeed affect one's practical reasoning, but it does this not by altering the structure of one's agential thought, but by changing what (...) reasons can become available. The importance of second-personal thought for action is heterogenous. Second-person relations make possible the emergence of a wide variety of different kinds of practical reasons: creating some, revealing others. Recognising this diminishes the appeal of the traditional, structural accounts of the practical significance of such second-personal relations. Moving away from structural accounts facilitates a more thorough understanding of the intersubjective form of action. (shrink)

It is common for people to be sensitive to aesthetic qualities in one another’s speech. We allow the loveliness or unloveliness of a person’s voice to make impressions on us. What is more, it is also common to allow those aesthetic impressions to affect how we are inclined to feel about the speaker. We form attitudes of liking, trusting, disliking or distrusting partly in virtue of the aesthetic qualities of a person’s speech. In this paper I ask whether such attitudes (...) could ever be legitimate. This is a microcosm of the broader issue of whether people’s aesthetic qualities in general can justify the interpersonal valuing-attitudes that they so often cause. I draw from recent discussions of body aesthetics to articulate a pair of challenges. One challenge says that aesthetic judgements of speech are reliant on unjustifiable prejudices. The other holds that a person’s aesthetic qualities are irrelevant to whether they should be liked. Against these challenges I argue that some speech can bear aesthetic qualities which are not reliant on prejudice and which are relevant to whether the speaker should be liked. I develop this argument through an analysis of the concept of lyricism. (shrink)

This volume which was compiled as a festschrift on the occasion of Russell's ninety-fifth birthday, contains a well-chosen combination of articles dealing with Russell's personality, political life, and influence upon public issues; as well as some rather more technical papers concerning Russell's theory of knowledge, sense-perception, his contribution to logical theory, and ontology. Of the popular and semi-popular pieces in the first half of this volume, many good things might be said; but especially worthwhile are I. F. Stone's moving article, (...) "To Oppose the Stream," an appreciation of Russell's courage and intellectual integrity, and Linus Pauling's bone chilling apocalyptic arithmetic in "Would Civilization Survive a Nuclear War?" It should also be added that Schoenman's introduction to the volume may be an important document in itself. The articles by Dana Scott and Georg Kreisel will be accessible only to readers with considerable training in logic and set theory, but will be of utmost interest to such specialists, as they concern the philosophically significant issues of improper descriptions, existence statements, and the extent to which logic can serve as "foundations" for mathematics. Putnam argues against the traditional logicist view and bases a good deal of his criticism upon the occurrence of impredicative definitions in Principia-type systems. The one sour note in the book is Quine's article on Russell's ontology, which occupies eleven rather insubstantial pages. Surely, this important facet of Russell's work deserves a more detailed exposition and analysis.—H. P. K. (shrink)

The material contained in this book is based on lectures given by Cohen at Harvard in 1965. It consists of a presentation of logic, set theory and other material, culminating in Cohen's ingenious proof of the independence of the continuum hypothesis and the axiom of choice. Since this proof is certainly one of the major developments in modern mathematics, Cohen's book is something of a necessity for every serious student of the foundations of set theory and mathematics. In addition to (...) Cohen's proof, the book also contains a chapter on Gödel's proof of the consistency of the continuum hypothesis and the axiom of choice, and a good deal of other material of general interest.—H. P. K. (shrink)

Ernest Nagel once remarked that it is fortunately not necessary to be clear about scientific philosophy and methodology in order to practice good science. He went on to say, "Even eminent scientists can make unholy spectacles of themselves when they don the mantle of philosophy and attempt to discuss the broad implications of their specialized labors." Feynman's recent venture into the philosophy of science is, unfortunately, a lucid illustration of the validity of Nagel's observations. The book is a rather literal (...) transcription of seven semi-popular lectures delivered by Feynman at Cornell in November of 1964. Feynman is a wonderful iconoclast, a legendary virtuoso of the bongo drums and—by the way—a Nobel laureate and one of the great theoretical physicists. But this is all the more reason to expect something a little more intellectually solid than is offered in this volume. It was obviously Feynman's intent to discuss some compelling problems which lie on the borderline of physics and philosophy with an intelligent lay audience. But few will be enlightened by Feynman's clever, if uninformative, discourse about such issues as the relation of mathematics to physics, symmetry and conservation laws, and probability and uncertainty. Feynman's finest hour undoubtedly comes in the lecture on quantum mechanics, in which some aspects of the wave-particle duality are presented. But the value of much of the rest of the book is severely qualified by the author's penchant for imprecise and confusing statements and, in some cases, outright mystery-mongering. This is a great pity because theoretical physics, especially in the hands of Richard Feynman, is a source of ideas which are most worth discussing.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This volume claims to offer first a correct interpretation of Hume's theory of causation, and second, a philosophical defense of it against many recent criticisms. The first two chapters try to reconcile Hume's two definitions of "cause," and to prove that Hume was not a skeptic about induction. The authors contend that Hume's views on causation can be rationally reconstructed as a unified theory that is, they believe, faithful to his intentions, namely that causation involves regularities or constant conjunctions, and (...) some kind of necessity. (shrink)

The ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas is typically associated with a punishing conception of responsibility rather than freedom. In this chapter, our aim is to explore Levinas’s often overlooked theory of freedom. Specifically, we compare Levinas’s account of freedom to the Kantian (and Fichtean) idea of freedom as autonomy and the Hegelian idea of freedom as relational. Based on these comparisons, we suggest that Levinas offers a distinctive conception of freedom—“finite freedom.” In contrast to Kantian autonomy, finite freedom constitutively involves (...) standing in certain social relations with others. And in contrast to Hegelian relational freedom, the social relations involved in finite freedom are not defined by mutual recognition, but by feelings of separation and even antagonism. Along the way, we promote a reading Levinas’s Totality and Infinity as a Hegel-style story of Bildung (development), and show how, on Levinas’s view, freedom can develop or mature in the life of the individual. (shrink)

Second-person relations are relations between individuals knowingly engaged in interaction with one another. These are the social contexts within which it is appropriate for one to think of and address another as ‘you’. This dissertation explores the practical consequences for agents of relating to others in this fashion. A critical analysis is offered of Stephen Darwall’s theory of moral obligations in terms of demands that can be addressed from the perspective of a second-person. On the basis of the criticisms raised, (...) a broader conception of ‘second-personal reasons’ is advanced according to which there are a variety of species of practical reasons that are essentially grounded in second-person relations between agents, besides moral obligations. A paradigm case of such a species is the reasons that are presented in requests, and one chapter of this work is devoted to explaining this power people often grant to others: to intentionally create new, discretionary reasons for them. Drawing from several historical antecedents – particularly Martin Buber, Simone Weil and Emmanuel Levinas – the analysis of second-personal reasons is extended to include a discussion of the proper object of agapic love, and a discussion of the possible significance that face-to-face encounters may have for moral epistemology. (shrink)

Russell writes with wit, candor, and uncommon honesty about his Victorian childhood, his painful adolescence, and his extracurricular amorous conquests. On the credit side, it must be said that it offers a remarkable insight into the development of a remarkable man. But for the benefit of those with more than a casual interest in the philosopher named Bertrand Russell, it should be mentioned that this book suffers from chronic intellectual malnutrition. Not that there isn't a lot of name-dropping and folksy (...) correspondence between the intellectual giants of the early twentieth century. There is a perfectly mad letter from Georg Cantor, who refers to Kant as "this abominable mummy"; and a perfectly charming one from Norbert Weiner's father, who, by way of introduction, states that his son has studied philosophy under "professors Royce, Perry, Palmer, Munsterberg, Schmidt, Holt, etc." In a delicious jest, Russell adds as a footnote, "Nevertheless he turned out well." There is, however, nothing substantial about philosophy in this book. At its close, Russell had completed Principia. He had returned to Cambridge already a most important figure in philosophy and mathematics. But there is no real discussion of the ideas which led up to and leavened this period in Russell's life. There is instead the dreary story of Whitehead's financial troubles. One hopes that a proper sense of the importance of things will be restored in future volumes of Russell's autobiography.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This recent addition to the well-known "Studies in Logic" series is sure to be of first importance to serious students of inductive logic, confirmation theory, and related issues. The book is an anthology of fourteen papers, which are classified under five different headings: "Extensions of Inductive Logic," "Induction and Information," "Prospects of Confirmation Theory," "The Paradoxes of Confirmation," and "Probability and Foundational Problems." Needless to say, all of the papers are of uniformly high quality. Especially worthy of mention are two (...) papers by Hintikka and Hilpinen which deal with an interesting generalization of Carnap's continuum of inductive methods, and which lead to a somewhat more plausible treatment of non-logically-true closed sentences. Suppes contributes two papers dealing with the recently revived Bayesian methods and their significance for concept formation in psychology and confirmation theory in the philosophy of science. Also under the heading of confirmation theory, one might mention Max Black's paper, "Notes on the Paradoxes of Confirmation," a lucid and rather novel approach to this problem. There is also an important paper by Dana Scott and Peter Krauss entitled "Assigning Probabilities to Logical Formulas." This piece of work presents a set-theoretical method for bridging the gap between the standard treatment of probability by means of axioms defining a real measure over a Boolean algebra and the usual logical inquiries into "degree of confirmation" and the like. The reference value of the book is enhanced by a subject index of terms and concepts dealt with in the various papers.—H. P. K. (shrink)